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electronic eavesdrop evidence within the purview of the fourth amendment,
physical trespass or no, so that it must satisfy rigidly applied fourth amend-
ment standards as to its origin or be excluded at both federal and state
trials. Further, permissive eavesdrop legislation seems now to face virtual
"presumptive invalidity" so that the burden is upon the legislature, propound-
ing it to embody full fourth amendment safeguards, Justice Black's Berger
dissent notwithstanding: "From the deficiencies the Court finds in the New
York statute, it seems -that the Court would be compelled to strike down a
state statute which merely tracked verbatim the language of the Fourth
Amendment itself." 90
William Hurst
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and
related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions."
9
oSupra note 63, at 1897. But cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963), Justice
Clark: "The states are not . . . precluded from developing workable rules governing
arrests, searches and seizures to meet the practical demands of effective criminal investi-
gation and law enforcement in the states, provided that those rules do not violate the
-constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant
command that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to
complain."
TORTS-DEFAMATION AND THE PRIVILEGED SPEECH
HIERARCHY-HOW LOW CAN YOU GO
The president of Queens College, acting under the authorization and ap-
proval of the chairman of the New York City Board of Higher Education,
issued a public statement in answer to charges of anti-Catholic discrimina-
tion in the promotional policies of the College. The statement was intended
and understood to refer to the plaintiffs, two associate professors at Queens
College. In a libel action brought by these professors alleging that they were
defamed by the statement, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
appellate division of the supreme court and held that the public expression
of the position of the Board was an appropriate exercise of discretion and was
absolutely privileged. Consequently, any teachers allegedly defamed by the
public statement were not entitled to recover. Lombardo v. Stoke, 18 N.Y.2d
394, 222 N.E.2d 721 (1966).
The significance of the decision lies in the extension of the doctrine of
absolute privilege to defame to members of a public school board. Although
a number of courts have granted such an official a qualified privilege,' never,
in the absence of a statute, has a court given a school board member absolute
1 Branaman v. Hinkle, 137 Ind. 496, 37 N.E. 546 (1894) ; Ebaught v. Miller, 127 Kan.
464, 274 P. 251 (1929) ; Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S.W. 878 (1910) ; Hett v.
Ploetz, 20 Wis. 2d 55, 121 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
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immunity from a civil suit. The distinction between granting an absolute
privilege rather than a qualified privilege is that the former provides immunity
regardless of the purpose or motive of the defendants, or the reasonableness
of his conduct, while the latter is conditioned on absence of malice and is
forfeited if it is abused.2 In view of this extension, the purpose of this note
is to trace the development and rationale of the doctrine of absolute privilege
as applied by the state and federal courts to public school officials and other
government executives, and to discuss a possible alternative to the privilege
to defame.
The underlying principle upon which the doctrine of privileged communica-
tion rests is public policy.3 Thus it has been held that on a balancing of
interests, democratic government is best served when public officials may
speak freely on questions of public concern, even if thereby some individual
be wrongly calumniated. 4 Consequently, because the public's right to know
must take precedence over the individual's right to defend his reputation in
court, an absolute privilege is extended to public officials when they speak
on matters of public concern, in the exercise of, and within the scope of,.
their duties. The defense is lost, however, if the alleged defamatory state-
ments are made by an official when not acting within the scope of his
official duties,5 or if the publication of the defamatory material is totally
unwarranted." Although the courts have applied similar reasoning in grant-
ing a privilege in the opposite situation, as when an individual criticizes a
public official, the privilege granted is only qualified, and the question of
malice remains paramount.7 But in neither case is the threat of a damage
suit permitted to inhibit or curtail the freedom of expression of either the
citizen or the public servant. 8
The basis for the Lombardo holding is found in an earlier New York
decision, Sheridan v. Crisona,9 wherein the Borough President of Queens
County made a report to the Mayor of New York City concerning the incom-
petence of a city appraiser. The report was later released to the press, where-
upon the appraiser sued for libel. The court held that any statement by a
public official which is "made in the course of the performance of some
2 PROSsER, TORTs 795-96 (3rd ed. 1964).
8 NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 380 (4th ed. 1924).
4 Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 823 (2d Dept. 1964) aff'd,
15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 620 (1965).
5James v. Powell, 14 N.Y.2d 881, 200 N.E.2d 772 (1964).
6 Cheatum v. Wehle, 5 N.Y.2d 585, 159 N.E.2d 166 (1959).
7 New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
8 Id.
9 14 N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d 359 (1964).
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function connected with [his] office" is absolutely privileged, 10 regardless of
whether the publication was motivated by malice or that the matter so
published was false and defamatory."
A case with a similar set of facts occurring in another state would likely
result in a different decision because of a strong conflict among the various
state courts in determining at what level in the executive hierarchy an
absolute privilege should be granted. Although the states have accorded
absolute immunity to statements of their highest officers, a summary of the
cases show that the majority of states have refused to extend the doctrine
to lower echelon officers, 12 and some earlier decisions have specifically denied
it to public school officials. 13 However, all states grant public officials a
qualified privilege. 14
There have been only two relatively recent state court decisions directly
involving absolute privilege as applied to school officials, and opposite results
were reached. The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to extend the doctrine
to school board members, stating that an absolute privilege is only granted
to officeholders of high level positions. 15 However, in Oklahoma, where
statutes provide that a privileged communication is one made in the "proper
discharge of an official duty,"' 6 'the supreme court held that when the presi-
dent of the Colored Agricultural and Normal University reported to the
Board of Regents about the immoral activities of an employee of the school,
he was clothed with absolute immunity, as he was operating in the "proper
discharge of an official duty."'
11
In Illinois, although there have been no supreme court decisions, the ap-
pellate court has extended the privilege considerably. Beginning by denying
it to a county superintendent,' 8 the privilege was firmly declared in Donner
1Old. at 113, 198 N.E.2d at 361.
11 Id. at 114, 198 N.E.2d at 362.
1 2 Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954); Bonham v. Dotson, 216 Ky.
660, 288 S.W. 297 (1926) ; Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962) ; Howland
v. Flood, 160 Mass. 509, 36 N.E. 482 (1894); Krebs v. McNeal, 222 Miss. 560, 76 So.
2d 693 (1955) ; contra, Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 311 P.2d 494 (1957) ; DeBolt v.
McBrien, 96 Neb. 237, 147 N.W. 462 (1914); Adams v. Tatsch, 68 N.M. 446, 362 P.2d
984 (1961); Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958).
13 Kenney v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 95 So. 34 (1923); Henry v. Moberly, 6 Ind. App.
490, 33 N.E. 981 (1892) ; Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho 609, 123 P. 478 (1912) ; Tanner v.
Stevenson, supra note 1; Samuelson v. Vinyard, 120 Ore. 197, 251 P. 719 (1926).
14 Supra note 7.
15 Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966).
1 6 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1443 (1961).
17 Sanford v. Howard, 185 Okla. 660, 95 P.2d 644 (1939). The same result was reached
when the president of the University of Oklahoma commented upon the fitness of one
of its librarians, Hughes v. Bizzell, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P.2d 763 (1941).
18 Rausch v. Anderson, 75 Ill. App. 526 (1898).
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v. Francis,19 where a civil service employee at a government hospital sued
his superior for allegedly defamatory remarks made against him. The court
said:
All communications, either verbal or written, passing between public officers
pertaining to their duties and in the conduct of public business are of necessity
absolutely privileged and such matters cannot be made the basis of recovery in
a suit of law.2°
Thus the position in Illinois is that if the acts complained of are made by a
person in the exercise of his lawful authority and duty, he cannot be held
responsible for such acts in a civil suit regardless of how erroneous the act
may have been and however injurious in consequence it may have proved
to the plaintiff.21 But despite this extension, the class of occasions where
publication of defamatory matter is absolutely privileged necessarily remains
narrow since the communication complained of in Donner was between public
officials. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the absolute privilege is limited
to legislative and judicial proceedings and to acts of state, including commu-
nications made in discharge of a duty under express authority of law.22
The federal courts have never applied the doctrine of absolute privilege
directly to public school officials, but they have demonstrated a very strong
tendency to give an absolute privilege to many officials of even lower rank.
Beginning with the landmark case of Spalding v. Villas,2 the Supreme Court
held that the official conduct of the Attorney General of the United States
could not be the subject of a civil suit, because to do so would cripple the
proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the execu-
tive branch of government.2 4 Once spawned by this decision, the doctrine
was carefully nurtured by a long series of lower federal court decisions and
was extended to the Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission,25
various members in the Comptroller General's office, 20 the Secretary of the
Interior, 27 members of a local draft board,28 and immigration officers.29
19 255 Ill. App. 409 (1930).
20 Id. at 412.
21 Id.
22 Larson v. Doner 32 M. App. 2d 471, 473, 178 N.E.2d 399, 400 (1961); Cook v. East
Shore Newspapers, Inc. 327 ll. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751 (1946).
23 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
2 4 Id. at 498.
25 Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
28 Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
27 Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
28 Gibson v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1949).
29 Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950).
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Another decisive Supreme Court case is that of Barr v. Matteo.30 A scandal
had developed in the Federal Office of Rent Stabilization, and when the acting
director of the agency was sued for implying in a press release that the
plaintiffs were responsible for the misdeeds, the Court applied the rule that
the acts of employees of the federal government falling within the "outer
perimeter of their line of duty" are absolutely privileged. 31 The public policy
argument for the recognition of the privilege was again clearly enunciated
when the Court said:
It has been thought important that officials of government should be free to
exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of
acts done in the course of those duties--suits which would consume time and
energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the
threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective
administration of policies of government.3 2
Furthermore, the Court held that -the existence of the privilege was not
dependent on the form of the statement involved--i.e., a letter, speech, or a
press release, but rather upon whether the statement was issued within the
scope of the official's duty. 33 The rules stated in Barr v. Matteo have enjoyed
consistent and wide following in the lower federal courts, and can be said
to be well settled.
3 4
In summary, the history of the case law relating to the doctrine of absolute
privilege reveals the interesting situation of the federal courts applying it
firmly and clearly, with the state courts remaining openly divided. Thus the
conflict between the public's interest in information and its interest in pro-
tecting individuals from unwarranted attack by government officials remains
an unsolved problem, although it has inspired suggested solutions from a
number of leading authorities. 35
Of these proposals, the best solution to the problem lies in the state as-
suming liability. Here the government accepts the liability of the officer, and
30360 U.S. 564 (1959).
31 Although the court has never expressly defined the term, it appears to include any
function remotely related to the officer's official duty. S & S Logging Co. v. Barker, 366
F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Keiser v. Hartman, 339 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 934 (1965); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964); Wozencraft v.
Captiva, 314 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1963).
32 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
33 Id. at 574-75.
84 Supra note 31.
35 Becht, The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 VAD. L. REV.
1127, 1162-64 (1962); Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MIcH. L. REV.
201, 232-34 (1956); Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 303,
347-48 (1959); Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against
Government Executive Officials, 74 HARv. L. REV. 44 (1960).
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the individual has a remedy without subjecting the official to the inhibitory
fear of personal responsibility. Certainly it is only right that the government
bear the ultimate burden of injuries which result from the pursuit of a public
interest. Restraint of irresponsible official conduct can then be achieved by
administrative discipline. While the Federal Tort Claims Act has moved in
this direction by including a broad waiver of sovereign immunity in tort,3 6
it still expressly excepts certain "intentional" torts, including defamation.3 7
The state legislatures, reluctant to waive sovereign immunity have done
virtually nothing to improve the situation.3 8 So long as government refuses
to face up to its responsibility, the courts must continue to resolve the prob-
lem, and the result may not be very promising to the one innocently defamed.
Michael Friedlander
36 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958).
3728 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1958).
38 See generally Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.L. Rav. 1363
(1954).
TORTS-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-SPECIAL
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Plaintiff slipped and fell upon the floor of a school building. Within a few
days her son contacted a member of the school board and advised him that
a claim for injuries would be brought before the board of education. Shortly
thereafter an investigating agent of the defendant school district contacted
plaintiff and obtained the information required by the notice provisions of
Illinois Revised Statutes chapter 122, section 823. Relying upon statements
by this agent that he would again contact the plaintiff relative to the claim,
the plaintiff failed to secure counsel or give timely notice. Subsequently, a
complaint by the plaintiff alleging negligence on the part of the school district
in the composition and care of the floor was dismissed upon motion by the
defendant in accord with Illinois Revised Statutes chapter 122, section 824,
which gives the school district a right to bar an action if the plaintiff fails
to file written notice within six months of the time of injury. Plaintiff suc-
cessfully appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the notice provisions,
which were alleged to be in violation of article IV, section 22 of the Illinois
State Constitution prohibiting special legislation. Lorton v. Brown County
Community Unit School Dist. No. 1, 35 Ill. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966).
The present case is one of several decisions handed down by the Illinois
Supreme Court in their attempt to up-date the out-moded rules concerning
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